Traitor Tracing Schemes constitute a very useful tool against piracy in the context of digital content broadcast. In such multi-recipient encryption schemes, each decryption key is fingerprinted and when a pirate decoder is discovered, the authorities can trace the identities of the users that contributed in its construction (called traitors). Public-key traitor tracing schemes allow for a multitude of non trusted content providers using the same set of keys, which makes the scheme "server-side scalable." To make such schemes also "client-side scalable," i.e. long lived and usable for a large population of subscribers that changes dynamically over time, it is crucial to implement efficient Add-user and Remove-user operations. Previous work on public-key traitor tracing did not address this dynamic scenario thoroughly, and there is no efficient scalable public key traitor tracing scheme that allows an increasing number of Add-user and Remove-user operations.
INTRODUCTION
An important application of global networking is digital content distribution. For such an application (e.g., Pay-TV) to remain economically viable for the long run, it is important to design distribution schemes with certain basic properties: (1) security--this assures a subscription-based model of exclusive content reception; (2) scalability--which assures efficient operation supporting many content providers and a dynamically changing population of subscribers; and (3) piracy protection--to prevent or deter illegal distribution.
To achieve security, a content distribution scheme requires to implement multi-user encryption mechanism that assures that only current subscribers can receive the content.
Regarding piracy protection, the state of the art method which applies to software-based platform-independent architectures, is the notion of traitor tracing schemes which we concentrate on in this work. A traitor tracing scheme is a multi-recipient encryption system that can be used for digital content distribution, with the property that the decryption key of each user is marked (fingerprinted). The server of the system is capable of using a traitor tracing algorithm: a procedure that given access to a pirate decoder is capable of recovering identities of subscribers that participated in its construction (called traitors). A traitor tracing scheme is, therefore, a deterrence to piracy due to the fear of exposure. SCALABLE SYSTEMS. In the context of content distribution, scalability has two facets: server-side and client-side.
Server-side scalability is assured by employing a public-key scheme, which allows any third party to use the encryption mechanism and broadcast digital content to the set of subscribers. This is very appealing as it allows a multitude of digital-content providers (e.g. many different channels) to take advantage of the availability of secure broadcast to distribute their content without the need to maintain relationships with clients. The clients are, in fact, managed by the system server that is only responsible for maintaining and assigning the clients' decryption keys as well as publishing the encryption key. Namely, the server acts as a pure key (and account) management service. Regarding client-side scalability, observe that digital content distribution systems typically involve a large population of users (accounts), that is changing dynamically during the life-time of the system. New users should be introduced, and others need to be removed from the active user population entitled to receive the digital content. To allow for a scalable management of accounts keys should be easy to generate and revoke.
To date, no schemes have been proposed that provide both client-side and server-side Scalability in the context of traitor tracing schemes. This motivates us to define and realize a Scalable Public-Key Traitor Tracing Schemes which achieves this combination.
PREVIOUS RESULTS. Traitor Tracing Schemes were introduced by Chor et al. [7] , who employed a probabilistic design: each user possesses a different subset of a set of keys and tracing is achieved using the properties of the key assignment. The results of Chor et al. were later implemented with concrete combinatorial designs by [21] . These schemes do not possess a Remove-user operation. Later these results were extended by [12, 18] , who also considered the combination of traitor tracing schemes with efficient revocation methods (cf. broadcast encryption, [11] ). These schemes are not scalable, since (i) they do not support public-key technology in an efficient fashion, (ii) they employ combinatorial designs for the key-assignment that require a tight guess of an a-priori bound on the number of users 1, and (iii) the ciphertext size is an increasing function of the total number of revoked users in the system's life-time.
A "native" public-key traitor tracing scheme was introduced in [16] and [3] (the latter introduced a public-key scheme with deterministic traceability); both schemes did not consider revocation of keys. This was considered in the work of [20] , however the number of revocations permitted by their public-key scheme is bounded. In particular, if the number of revocations executed in the life-time of the system exceeds the bound, this would allow previously revoked users to gain unlawful access to the system. Furthermore, the ciphertext size is linear in the revocation bound, something that prohibits (for efficiency purposes) to set the bound to a large value. Public-key traitor tracing schemes with comparable revocation capabilities as the [20] -scheme (bounded number of revocations) were also designed in [22] and [9, 10] . In all these schemes the bound on the number of revocations is proportional to the ciphertext size of the system. We remark that the scheme of [9] allows for an unlimited number of revocations, however this results in a degradation of the scheme's efficiency in the course of its run-time operation (as ciphertext sizes also depend logarithmically on the size of the user population) We note that client-side scalability was recognized as an important issue and was considered in the context of long lived broadcast encryption in [13] ; it can also be achieved in the context of multicast refresh-key [23, 6, 20] . These schemes however, do not operate in a server-scalable environment. In conclusion, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing schemes satisfies the requirements of a Scalable; Public-Key Traitor Tracing Scheme.
OUR RESULTS. We introduce the first carefully formalized model and design of a scalable public-key traitor tracing scheme where an unlimited number of users can be added and removed efficiently from the system. Addition ¢Jf users 1Note that adding users beyond the bound would still be possible but it would be an expensive operation affecting the existing subscribers of the system. does not affect the keys of the existing users of the system, further, the design does not require an &-priori bound on the number of users. User removal is achieved by dividing the run-time of the system into periods; in each period a bounded number of user removals can be executed; unlimited number of user-removals is achieved in our design by the implementation of an efficient change-period operation.
Our scheme allows efficient deterministic traitor tracing that recovers all traitors (in the non-black-box traceability setting), while supporting the black-box confirmation method [3] , (for black-box traitor tracing model).
In a scalable scheme, adversaries can run the Add-user protocol to introduce adversarially-controlled users in the system, and they can observe the modifications to the public key of the scheme that occur during the run-time operation of (;he scheme and potentially take advantage of them. We consider two types of adversaries, the ones that try to elude the traceability capability, and the ones that attempt to defeat (;he revocation mechanism of the system (the adversarial goal is distinct in these two cases, hence the differentiation between the two).
• Traceability Adversary: the adversary obtains so:me user-keys and constructs a pirate decryption device, employing the secret user-key information. We show that our construction is secure against this type of adversaries in the non-black-box traitor tracing model. Our traitor tracing algorithm is deterministic and recovers the identities of all traitors. Furthermore, our scheme supports the black-box confirmation method, that allows a form of traceability in the black-box traitor tracing model, [3] .
• Window Adversary: the adversary obtains some userkeys that are subsequently revoked; the adversary :remains active and observes the revocation of other users of the system (in fact we allow the adversary to adaptively select which users are revoked). We show that our construction is secure against window adversaries as long as they are fully revoked in a "window" of the system's operation that has a certain length (which is specified as a system parameter).
The advantage of our scalable construction over previous schemes, comes from the fact that any fully revoked adversary in a window of the system's operation will, in fact, "expire." An expired adversary will be incapable of intercepting the scrambled content (in the semantic security sense) even if it remains active in the system (and can still choose which revocation to apply). It is the capability of our scheme to expire adversaries that allows for the enhanced functionality of an unlimited number of revocations. None of the previous public-key traitor tracing schemes with revocation capability [20, 22, 9, 10] possessed this crucial property. In Table 1 we compare our construction to previous public-key schemes.
OUR MODEL: SCALABLE PUBLIC-KEY TRACING AND REVOKING
The life-time of a scalable public-key traitor tracing scheme is divided into periods. A period is an administrative unit managed based on activity and potentially time passing. A scalable scheme is comprised of the following procedures:
[NP00] (PK-Scheme) [3] that requires exponential-time. and "unlimited" means that any polynomial number of users (in the security parameter) can be supported.
• Setup. An initialization procedure that is executed by the server; it outputs a public key e. • Broadcast Encryption. A public encryption algorithm g that takes as input the public key e, and a plaintext M, and outputs a ciphertext C. The ciphertext C is distributed to a population of users through a broadcast channel.
• Decryption. A deterministic algorithm D that takes as input the ciphertext C, and a user's secret-key information and decrypts C.
• Add-user. It is a key-generation procedure that results in a personalized secret key that can be used to invert the public key e. It is executed by the server and secretly communicated to a new user of the system. • Remove-user. A procedure T¢ that given a public key e and a user's secret key d, results in a public key #, so that for all messages M, g(e', M) should be "incomprehensible" for the user holding the revoked secret key d, while non-removed users should be capable of decrypting it.
The revocation procedure has a saturation limit that is an upper bound to the number of users that can be removed inside a period.
• Tracing. A procedure T that given the contents of a pirate-decoder outputs the identities of the traitor users whose keys are employed in the pirate-decoder. • New-period. A procedure followed by the server that results in a special message transmitted to the active subscribers of the system that changes the period.
Users removed in previous periods should be incapable of decrypting any data transmitted inside the new period. A period can be changed when the saturation limit is reached (a reactive change), or when a certain time-limit is reached (a pro-active change).
SCALABILITY OBJECTIVES. The properties of the various functions of a scalable scheme should satisfy the following requirements:
• Efficient addition of unlimited number of users throughout the scheme's operation. Specifically, the Add-user operation should be a protocol executed between a new user and the server, that should have (i) communication independent of the size of the user-population, and (ii) it should not involve the existing users of the system in any way.
Efficient traitor tracing of a pirate-decoder. Specifically, the tracing procedure should be polynomial-time in the number of users and the number of traitors.
Efficient revocation of the decryption capabilities of a set of users inside a period, provided that the number of users to be removed is below the saturation-limit.
Specifically, Remove-user should have time complexity independent of the number of users, and should be executed solely by the server, affecting only the public key of the system.
Efficient introduction of a new period. The communication overhead for changing a period should be independent of the number of users of the system and it should not require private communication channels between the server and the active users (but contrary to Remove-user it will require from users to modify their secret-keys --as a result in our model users are stateless within a period and statefull across periods).
FORMAL MODELING OF SCALABLE SCHEMES. The functionality of a scalable public-key traitor tracing scheme should be two-fold: on one hand, it should be capable of identifying users that participate in the construction of pirate-decoders; on the other hand, the system should be capable of revoking the decryption capabilities of "bad" users. We formally model the security of tracing and revocation in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively.
DISCRETE-LOG REPRESENTATIONS 3.1 The Intractability Assumption
Let G be a large cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q. Typically we assume that G is the subgroup of order q of Z~, where q ] p -1 and p, q are large primes. We denote by [q] the set {0,..., q -1}. The intractability assumption we employ is the following: It is well known (see [5] ) that obtaining representations of a given y w.r.t, some base h0,..., hv is as hard as the discrete-log problem over G. Furthermore, it was shown in [3] t:hat if some adversary is given m < v random representations of some y with respect to some base, then any additional representation that can be obtained has to be a "convex combination" of the given representations (a convex combination of the vectors ~1,... 5~ is a vector ~=~ tte~e with ~:em=~ pe = 1). However, our scheme makes use of a particular family of discrete-log representations, introduced below. In section 6 we will see how Lemma 3.2 of [3] can be modified accordingly.
Leap-Vectors
We introduce a new family of discrete-log representations, called leap-vectors. Let 
z~, P(z~,)).
As a result the possession of a leap-vector implies some knowledge about the polynomial P beyond what is implied by the points (zl, P(zl)),..., (z~, P(z,) ). In other words a leap-vector is the necessary information needed to leap from the values P(zl),..., P(z~,) to the value P(0).
OUR SCHEME
Setup. The description of a.cyclic multiplicative group G: of order q is generated. Then, t~vd'random generators g, g' E and two random polynomials A, B C ]F[x] of degree v are selected. The parameter v has the following properties: (i) m = v/2 will be the maximum traitor collusion size, and (ii) v will be the saturation limit. Let L is a system variable known to the server.
Add-user. When a new user i requests to be introduced to the system, the server transmits to the user the tuple contains all values xi that were selected in previous Add-user protocols. Subsequently, the server records the value xi as associated to user i and adds xi to b/.
Encryption. The sender obtains the public key of the system and then employs the encryption function E that given a plaintext M E G, selects a random r Eu Remove-user. Let ix,...,ik be the identities of the users to be removed, so that L + k < v. Suppose that the current public-key has the form ff ---(g, g', y, (Zl, hi) ,..., (zv, hv}>.
The revocation procedure 7E, uses the (private) user database and modifies the current public key ff as follows:
g= (g,g',y, (zl, h,) Finally, the saturation level is increased to L := L + k.
N e w -p e r i o d . When the saturation level L reaches the saturation limit v, the server defines a new period. First, the server broadcasts a special message "change period" (not encrypted). Note that we assume that change period is digitally signed by the server so that no third parties can maliciously initiate the new-period mode. Upon receiving the signed change period message, the ith user of the system enters a wait mode. When it receives the encrypted message enc(u), the user decrypts it and decodes it using enc -1. Then, modifies his secret tuple <x,, A(x,), B(x,)}, to (x,, u . A(x,), u . B(x,)).
DEALING WITH REVOCATION

Model for Revocation
The public-key traitor tracing scheme described in Section 4 withstands a more powerful type of attack than what has been considered so far in previous related work ( [20, 22, 9, 10] ). In such attack scenario, adversary .A is allowed not only to join the system a bounded number of times v (equal to the saturation level, which is fixed as a system parameter), but also to observe and even actively affect the evolution of the system, by specifying which users should be revoked and their relative order in the sequence of revocations. We remark that this type of adversary defeats all previous publickey traitor tracing schenms with fixed ciphertext size, [20, 22, 10] .
More formally, in our model the adversary interleaves, in any adaptively chosen order, two types of queries:
• Join query: it models the subscription to the system of a malicious user controlled by the adversary. To reply to such query, the server executes an Add-user operation and gives to the adversary the newly created user-key. Notice that after a Join query, the adversary obtains a valid user-key capable of recovering subsequent encrypted broadcasts.
• Revoke query: it models the revocation of a user from the system. To reply to such query, the server performs a Remove-user operation and gives .A the new public key that results after the invalidation of the key corresponding to the user revoked.
Notice that the main constraint we impose to the adversary's behavior is that she can make at most v Join queries; no restriction is given for Revoke queries. Whenever A has finished collecting the amount of information she thinks she needs to maximize her chances to win the game, she outputs a pair of messages and receives back the encryption of either one with probability 1/2.
To fully appreciate the novelty of the attack scenario proposed above, recall that in previous work the only functionality conceded to .,4 was to obtain the secret key of a user which was also simultaneously revoked from the system. In our model, such capability, usually called corruption, is split into two distinct operations. This clearly allows the adversary to mount more powerful attacks, and does indeed more closely model the reality, since the server not always find out about "bad" users immediately. Moreover, keeping the Join and Revoke operations distinct, allows us to impose on the adversary the (minimal) restriction of obtaining at most v user-keys, without bounding the number of Revoke queries. This constitutes a major novelty of our adversarial model, since in all previous work both the number of revoked users and the number of compromised user-keys (tied together by the definition of corruption query) were required to be bounded by v.
Clearly, for the challenge to the adversary not to be trivial, all the user-keys that .,4 obtains through Join queries must have been rendered useless by corresponding subsequent Revoke queries. We model this necessary constraint requiring that before .,4 asks for her challenge, there should have been an instant at which a Change-Period operation happened, such that during the window of v immediately preceding revocations, all the (at most v) user-keys in the adversary's possession are revoked.
FORMAL MODEL FOR WINDOW ADVERSARY. We now present a formal description of the above attack scenario. For a given value of the security parameter A, the Setup algorithm is run and the adversary is given the public key of the system. Then .. 4 
Security of Revocation
We now formally prove that our scalable public-key traitor tracing scheme described in Section 4 is secure against a window adversary (as defined above). In the security proof, we will follow the same structural approach used in [10] , first advocated in [8] . Starting from the actual attack scenario, we will consider a sequence of hypothetical games, all defined over the same probability space. In each game, the adversary's view is obtained in different ways, but its distribution is still indistinguishable among the games.
The security of our scheme relies on the DDH assumption as shown in the Theorem below.
THEOREM 4. If the decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem is hard in G, then the scheme presented above is secure against a chosen-plaintext attack.
PROOF. As a preliminary step, we first argue that the "window constraint" that our model imposes on the adversary's behavior suffices to invalidate all the user-keys that adversary .,4 could have learned via Join queries. Indeed, such constraint implies that there must have been a Change Period operation encrypting the "reset information" u when the current public key was of the form g = (g, g', (xj~, hj~ ),..., (xj~, hj~ )) and {il ..... is } C {jl,..., j~ }, where xi~,..., xi, are the values corresponding to the current user-keys that ,,4 holds. Hence, A couldn't generate the leap-vector o7i and ~ (necessary to recover u from the broadcast) from any of the user-keys in its possession: it follows that ..4 could not update any of its user-keys. Therefore, all the secret data that .,4 gathered via the Join queries is completely useless to recover any message (and in particular A's challenge) encrypted after the Change-Period operation under consideration.
We now define the sequence of "indistinguishable" games Go, G1,..., where Go is the original game, and the last game clearly gives no advantage to the adversary.
Game Go. Recall that in Go, A receives the public key and adaptively asks Join and Revoke queries. Then, .A queries the encryption oracle on (Mo,M1) and receives back the encryption of one of them. Eventually, ..4 outputs her guess a* C {0, 1}. Let To be the event that o-= or* in game Go.
Game G~. Game G~ is identical to game Go, except that, in G1, the encryption algorithm first picks a random r Eu [q], then defines u = g~ and u' ~ (g,)r, and finally outputs (g~, (g,)r, y~.M, (zl, u A(~I) (u')S(~x)),.
•
., (zv, u A(~) (u')B(~")).
It is clear that such modification is just a syntactic change; hence, letting T1 be the event that o-= a* in game G~, it holds that [Pr [To] 
Game G2. To turn game G1 into game G2 we make another change to the encryption oracle used in game G-1. Namely, the encryption algorithm now picks two random values r, r' Eu [q] . The definition of the values u, u' changes, too: u =" gr and u ~ =" (g')"'. Let T2 be the event that a = a* in game G2. Notice that while in game G1 the values u mad u ~ are obtained using the same value r, in game G2 they are totally independent, subject to r 5~ r ~. Therefore, using a standard reduction argument, any non-negligible difference in behavior between G1 and G2 can be used to construct a PPT algorithm A1 that distinguishes Diffie-Hellman tuples from totally random tuples with non negligible advantage. Game G3. To define game G3, the encryption oracle is modified once again to output as challenge for the adversary the ciphertext (gr, (g,)r, yt, ( zl, uA(z')(u') s(zl) 
DEALING WITH TRACEABILITY
The goal of a tracing algorithm is to obtain the identity of at least one of the pirates who colluded in creating a given "pirate decoder" D which, as in prior works, is assumed to be stateless. In this section we present two tracing algorithms that can be integrated within the scheme described above.
The first method, a non-black-box algorithm, receives as input a "valid" key extracted from a pirate device, constructed using the keys of at most m users. ~ The second method, a black-box algorithm, repeatedly calls a black-box confirmation subroutine that, given a pirate decryption device and a subset of at most m suspected users, checks whether their user-keys were used to generate the key inside the device. It deterministically extracts the set of users whose user-keys were used to generate the pirate key.
Tracing Attack Scenario
Our adversary .,4 operates similarly to the corresponding adversary in Section 5. Namely, after receiving the initial public key of the system, she can interleave (in any adaptively chosen order) up to m Join queries, upon which .4 receives the secret keys of the corresponding users, and a polynomial number of Revoke queries. Notice that each Revoke will change the public key, and the adversary monitors these changes as well. Also notice that the final set of "revoked" user is likely very different, and typically disjoint from the set of m "corrupted" users. At the end, ,.4 outputs a pirate decoder D which presumably works "well" with the current public key (denoted PK.a). The job of the tracing 2Recall, m denotes the collusion threshold, and should not be confused with the revocation threshold v discussed in Section 4; e.g., in our schemes m. _< v/2.
algorithm is to find one or all of the (at most) m traitors whose keys were used to build D. The precise security guarantees depend on whether tracing is "black-box" or not. We describe both tracing methods in the next two subsections.
Non-Black-Box Algorithm
Our non-black-box tracing algorithm, presented below, is building on the results of [3, 20] and is tailored to our family of representations. Remember that a user-key is a vector (a, fl, ~1, • • •, ~) where C a, "n, • • •, "Y~) and (/3, 71, • • •, ~) are leap-vectors associated to the two points that the user receives when joins the system, and w.r.t, the values available in the public-key. Also notice that any such leap vector • E P (where zl..z~ are currently revoked users)
Zl~...~z v will work for decrypting message encrypted with the current public key. In the non-black-box model, we make an assumption that the system can extract the secret key hidden in the illegal decoder and that this secret key must be a leap-vector G • E P This assumption seems to be Zl ~.,. ~zv • very reasonable, it is further justified by Proposition 3 and was previously used by [3] . It is also a-priori much less restrictive than the assumption made by [20] stating that the illegal key must be a convex linear combination of some of the traitors' keys. Luckily, Lemma 5 (whose proof is in the Appendix) shows that this seemingly more restrictive assumption actually follows from our initial assumption.
LEMMA 5. If there exist a poly-time adversary ...4 that, given the public key (g,g',Y, (z~,h,),..., (z~,h~)) and m < v user-keys denoted by ~,...5~, computes a new, valid • user-key 6 that is not a convex linear combination of51,... 5~m then the discrete-log problem over G is solvable.
We now present a deterministic tracing algorithm that, using an error-correcting code subroutine, reveals the identities of the traitors that created the pirate key. 
A~)M(z,~) = M(O).
Consider the matrix A whose jth row is (A~) .... , A~)), j = 1,..., n, (i.e. obtained projecting the user-key of the generic user j onto the last v components). By assumption, ~ is a linear combination of at most v/2 user-keys. Therefore, there exist a vector ~ of Hamming weight at most v/2 such that if-A = ~ (*). Consider the two matrices with degree(M) < n. In the following Lemma (whose proof is in the Appendix), we prove that C is a Generalized ReedSolomon Code (GRS). For more details about Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes, see [17] .
LEMMA 6. It holds that,
degree(M) < n -v}.
C is a linear code with message-rate (n-v)/n and distance v + 1.
Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes can be decoded efficiently by the algorithm of Berlekamp and Welch [1] . This means that for any vector ~ 6 Z~ for which there exists a vector 6 C that disagrees with ~ in at most e positions with e < ~-(~-~) = v/2, it holds that ~ is unique with this --2
property (C has distance v + 1) and the vector ~ can be recovered in deterministic polynomial-time.
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRACING ALGORITHM. We describe how to reconstruct P given ~ using the algebraic decoding algorithm of the linear code C: ff immediately reveals the indices {il,...,im} = {i I (i < n) A v~ # 0}. Provided that m _< v/2, it holds that the Hamming weight of g is less than or equal to v/2 and as a result Ois a n-vector that differs in at most v/2 positions from the vector ~ (which belongs to C). As a result we can view 0 as a "partially corrupted" ~ (in at most v/2 positions) and employ the error correcting algorithm of the linear code C to recover ~, by running the Berlekamp-Welch decoding algorithm for GRScodes on input 0. Then, ~ can be computed as ~ = 0-~. TIME-COMPLEXITY. The tracing procedure has time complexity O(n2), which can be optimized to O(n(logn)2), if matrix operations are implemented in a more sophisticated manner, see e.g. [2] . If the number of traitors exceeds the bound v/2, it is still possible to extract candidate sets of potential traitors, by employing GRS-decoding "beyond the error-correction bound", the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm, [14] . This will work provided that the size of the traitor collusion is less or equal to n -~/n(n -v).
TRACING. Suppose that the contents of a pirate-decoder are exposed. In order to decrypt, a pirate-decoder should contain a representation 5 of y w.r.t, hi,..., hr. Let the identities of the traitor users be (Q,... ,ira} C_ {1,... ,n}, where n is the number of currently active users of the system. Due to Lemma 5, 5 should be a convex combination of the vectors 5~1,..., 5~m that correspond to the traitors' user-keys Now suppose that ~, . . . , ~ are all the user-keys that were given to the subscribers of the system so far. It follows that must be in the linear span of ~, . . . ,~. Provided that m < v/2, we use the tracing algorithm that was presented above to obtain the identities of the traitors { i l , . . . , ira}.
Black-Box Algorithm
Our Black-Box algorithm will access the decoder in a blackbox way (namely, it cannot extract the algorithm or the keys hidden inside D, but can observe D's input-output behavior). Also similarly to previous works [4, 20, 22] , our algorithm will only efficiently achieve the black-box confirmation property. Informally, this is a subroutine that can be used to test whether a given set Susp of at most m suspected users does include all the traitors that cooperated to construct a given pirate decoder D (and outputs at least one such pirate). On a pessimistic note, this means that our tracing algorithm might have to go through all m-element subsets of the user set to do full-fledged tracing. However, we point out that: (1) in many cases a lot of partial information about the set of corrupted users, makes the search dramatically smaller; (2) all the previous public-key traitor tracing schemes suffer from the same problem; (3) as observed in [15] , the problem seems to be inherent in our setting.
However, we significantly improve the previous black-box confirmation algorithms in the tbllowing respects: (1) formal modeling of the problem; (2) our algorithm allows the adversary to adaptively corrupt players before building the pirate decoder; (3) our algorithm works as long as the decoder works on at least on t fraction of correctly formed messages (rather than with probability 1; call such decoders e-useful), where ~ is the desired threshoki below which the decoder is considered "useless" (following the "threshold tracing" approach of [19] • C o n f i r m a t i o n : if 13 C Susp then BBCD(pK, Susp) outputs some i E 13.
• S o u n d n e s s :
OUR BLACK-BOX CONFIRMATION ALGORITHM. The algorithm below assumes the collusion threshold m is at most v/2 (precisely, 2 m -1 < v). Based on the current suspect set I (initialized to Susp) and using the secret key SK, our BBC will create an invalid public key P K ( I ) (the initial value of the public key is P K x ) . is "non-trivial" (specifically, at least t / 2 m ) , it proclaims i as a traitor. Otherwise, it sets I := I \ {i}, and repeats the entire procedure until I = 0 (in which case it outputs '?').
The last main detail to be filled in is how the algorithm generates the invalid public key P K ( I ) . Recall The above Lemma immediately implies the soundness of our algorithm. Namely, it can accuse an innocent user with at most a negligible probability. Informally, under the DDH assumption it is impossible to notice if the value (A(i), B(i)) (unknown to the adversary) was replaced by a random noise (A'(i), B'(i)). And the intuitive reason why we need 2 m -1 < v is that the adversary gets m shares of the secret key from users in B, and another (at most) m -1 shares ace fixed by I \ {i}. Hence, if we had 2m -1 > v (the degree of our polynomials), the adversary can do the interpolation in the exponent to check the consistency of all the values in the enabling block, easily spotting which ones are "real" and which ones are "fake". (And it turns out that the above minimal restriction is sufficient to prove Lemma 8). The above Lemma implies that if the box was useful at the start (i.e., SUCCPK(D) ~ g) and B C Susp, then the decoder cannot "notice" that P K was changed to PK(Susp), i.e. 5(Susp) ,~ t. a Coupled with the obvious fact that 5(~}) is negligible (since M is encrypted with a totally random one-time pad), we see that there must be a time when 5(I) changes by a non-trivial amount (i.e., at least by t/2rn) when we remove some i E I. This i will then be output by our algorithm, and since i cannot be an innocent user (by Lemma 8), i must be one of the traitors. This shows the confirmation property.
MANAGEMENT OF RUN-TIME PERIOD DIVISION
Normally, the New-Period operation is invoked every v user removals (the saturation limit). However, depending on the system operation, may be useful to invoke the New-Period 3The relation ~ is meant to indicate that 5(Susp) is greater than t minus negligible terms. operation more frequently. In fact, the regular policy guarantees (Theorem 4) that any adversary that is contained in the window of the last v revocations will expire. If a NewPeriod is issued every v revocations it is not guaranteed that it will expire any adversary that is revoked in a span of any consecutive v revocations. For this reason we can employ a parameter a E {1,..., v --1} and issue a New-Period every a revocations. This guarantees that any adversary that is revoked in a span of any v -a consecutive revocations will expire as the following Theorem reveals (see the proof in the final version of the paper).
THEOREM 10 . If a New-Period is issued every a revocations (1 <_ a < v), then any window adversary that is totally revoked in a span of v -a revocations will expire.
We also remark that New-Period operations can be issued after a certain timer expires. This proactive mode of operation can be employed in addition to the reactive mode of issuing a New-Period every a revocations. It increases the system's resilience to window adversaries in the following sense: assume that the timer expires after ~-time units; if the expected number of revocations in ~-time-units is p, we can argue that our system is expected to expire any adversary that is totally revoked within a time span of (~ -2)stime-units.
